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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
JILL FAIRBANKS, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, Case No. 950371-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal properly lies with the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue presented is whether the Court erred in 
determining that the provision of the Decree of Divorce which 
requires the Defendant to compensate the Plaintiff for her 
increased income tax liability if he claims the dependency 
exemptions should be based upon her actual married-joint filing 
status. The trial court determined that the economic reality of 
the circumstances included the Plaintiff's filing of a married-
joint tax return for the tax year 1993 for which she is jointly 
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and severally liable and which formed the basis for determining 
the Plaintiff's tax liability. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial court7s decision to enforce the parties7 agreement 
should not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of 
discretion. Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, 781 P.2d 487 at 479 (Utah App. 1989). Whether the 
language of the stipulation and decree is ambiguous is a question 
of law and should be reviewed for correctness. Equitable Life 
and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 at 1192 (Utah 
App.) cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah, 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDING. 
The Defendant appeals the Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered May 2, 1995, which, in effect, denies the 
Defendant's Motion to Compel the refund of tax payments made to 
the Plaintiff pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. However, an 
Order of identical content referring to the Defendant's same 
Motion was entered February 3, 1995 and not appealed from. 
Additionally, an earlier "Recommendation and Order" which denies 
the Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement was entered by the 
court on December 27, 1994, and not appealed. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. On August 17, 1992, the parties entered into an oral 
stipulation, read on the record, before the trial court, to 
settle the remaining issues of their bifurcated divorce. [R. 610 
- 616] 
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2. The stipulation was read on the record by the 
Defendant's attorney. [R. 610] 
3. The oral stipulation provided, in part, as follows: 
. . . Mrs. Fairbanks will provide her tax 
return to Mr. Fairbanks and he can elect to, 
within 15 days thereafter, to provide tax 
returns prepared at his expense. He could 
then purchase any of the tax exemptions for 
the parties' minor children by paying the 
difference between her tax liability by not 
claiming those particular exemptions. He 
must pay that amount to her by April 10th of 
that year. [R. 615 - 616] 
4. Based upon the oral stipulation the Defendant's 
attorney prepared a "Supplemental Decree of Divorce" entered by 
the court January 19, 1992. [R. 308 - 317] 
5. The "Supplemental Decree of Divorce" provides as 
follows: 
16. The Defendant is awarded the right to 
purchase the tax exemptions for the parties' 
minor children from Plaintiff. Defendant may 
exercise this right by paying to Plaintiff 
any difference in her tax liability resulting 
from Defendant purchasing the right to claim 
said tax exemptions. 
6. The Plaintiff was awarded alimony which was to 
terminate upon her remarriage. (Supplemental Decree of Divorce, 
f2, at R. 2) 
7. The parties had four children born as issue of the 
marriage and child support entered in the total base award amount 
of $1,187. {R. 2 and R. 309] 
8. The child support calculation included the imputation 
of income to the Plaintiff of $731 per month. [R. 431] 
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9. The Findings of Fact are silent as to the relevant 
incomes of the parties. 
10. The Defendant claimed the exemption for the tax year 
1992 [R. 379] and acknowledged that, due to the Plaintiff's 
remarriage, that would be the last year that he would likely 
claim those exemptions pursuant to the Decree. [R. 37 9] 
11. The Plaintiff remarried February 18, 1993. [R. 359] The 
Defendant remarried May 17, 1994. [R. 384] The Plaintiff filed a 
married-joint tax return for the tax year 1993 which reflected 
earned income by the Plaintiff and her spouse. [R. 380] 
12. The Defendant paid the Plaintiff $3,044.49 pursuant to 
the Decree and claimed the minor children of the parties as 
exemptions for tax return purposes. [R. 360] Subseguently, the 
Defendant brought a Motion "to Compel Plaintiff to refund payment 
demanded for execution of release of tax exemptions." [R. 363] 
13. Following the hearing before the Commissioner, the 
matter was heard based upon the Plaintiff's objection by the 
trial judge which resulted in a denial of the Defendant's Motion 
to compel the refund. [R. 618 - 621] 
14. The court's "Recommendation and Order" dealing with the 
issue of tax exemptions and other matters was signed and entered 
December 27, 1994 after being served upon the Defendant by mail 
October 27, 1994. [R. 476 - 481] 
15. That Order provides, in part, as follows: 
13. The Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Reimbursement of Sums paid to the Plaintiff 
represents reimbursement to the Plaintiff for 
her tax liability from not claiming the 
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parties' minor children as her dependents for 
tax purposes is denied consistent with the 
court's ruling based upon the Plaintiff's 
objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendation. [R. 479] 
16. In addition, based upon the trial court's ruling, the 
Plaintiff's counsel prepared an Order which included the court's 
findings and conclusions. That Order was objected to by the 
Defendant. At a hearing dated January 9, 1995, the court 
directed Plaintiff's counsel to submit a new Order which deleted 
references to the findings and conclusions of the court, which 
were to be established by way of a transcript of the ruling. 
That Order was prepared by Plaintiff's counsel, served upon the 
Defendant by mail, [R. 562] and entered by the court February 3, 
1995. [R. 560 - 561] No appeal was taken from that Order or the 
previous Order, dated December 27, 1995. 
17. Subseguently, a third Order was signed and entered by 
the court identical in every respect to the Order of February 3, 
1995 except for the signature of the Defendant approving that 
Order as to form. That Order was also served upon the Defendant 
on January 9, 1995. [R. 599 - 601] 
18. The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 1, 1995. 
19. the Plaintiff disputes the factual allegations 
contained in the Appellant's principal brief which are not 
substantiated by the record including any reference to tax years 
subsequent to 199 3 which were not part of the court's Order, or 
the Defendant's Motion and have no basis in the record. 
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20. In denying the Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Reimbursement, the trial judge noted: 
(a) That the child support guidelines for the State of 
Utah changed as of July, 1994, and the previous guidelines 
presumed that the custodial parent would enjoy the right to 
claim the minor child as exemptions (resulting in a 
reduction of support paid to the custodial parent). [R. 619] 
(b) That once remarried, the Plaintiff has the 
alternative of filing a joint or separate-married return and 
that her tax liability is based upon her filing status and 
her liability is joint and several under joint return. [R. 
620] 
(c) That to sustain the Defendant's Motion would 
require that the court entertain "hypothetical calculations" 
and would ignore the economic reality of the parties' 
circumstances. 
(d) Based upon that the court concluded that the 
Decree of Divorce contemplated the calculation of tax 
liability based upon the actual tax return filed by the 
Plaintiff and, therefore, the Defendant's Motion should be 
denied. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. The 
content of the Order appealed from is identical in every respect 
to the court's earlier Order dated February 3, 1995, except the 
May 2, 1995 Order was approved by the Defendant as to form. The 
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February 3rd Order was properly served upon the Defendant and 
submitted to the court pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration.1 The mere fact that the Defendant approved that 
same Order as to form, and apparently submitted the same to the 
court and it is entered does not extend the time to appeal, 
especially where the provisions of the two Orders are identical. 
The Defendant's June 1, 1995 Notice of Appeal is more than thirty 
(30) days after the February 3, 1995 Order. 
The court was correct in interpreting the Decree of Divorce. 
The Plaintiff's tax liability is the tax liability she has under 
the tax return she files as a married spouse. In this case, the 
Plaintiff filed a joint tax return with her husband. She is, 
thereby, jointly and severally liable for the tax obligation of 
that return. The parties obviously contemplated that they each 
would remarry. Both parties have remarried. By virtue of that 
fact, the Plaintiff no longer is entitled to receive alimony. 
There is no language altering the Defendant's right to claim the 
children as tax exemptions upon Plaintiff's remarriage. At best, 
the Defendant could claim rights to modify the Decree of Divorce 
by virtue of the Plaintiff's remarriage if he is claiming that it 
was an unanticipated substantial change. However, otherwise, it 
would be an anticipated event which was not included as any sort 
of a limiting factor in the Decree as it provides to tax 
exemptions. 
1
 The January 9th Order was mailed to the Defendant along 
with a cover letter explaining that the Defendant had five (5) 
days to object and that the Order was served pursuant to the 
Rules of Judicial Administration. That letter does not appear of 
record in this case, but, as a convenience, is included in the 
Addendum. 
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The Plaintiff's new spouse is obligated to support his step 
children, and he does, pursuant to §78-45-4.1. Additionally, 
"support received from a parent's spouse upon remarriage is 
treated as having been received from the parent." (I.R.C. 
§152(e)(5)) 
The child support that the Plaintiff receives in this case 
is still governed by the pre-1994 guidelines. Those guidelines 
included a reduced amount of child support based upon the 
assumption that the custodial parent would enjoy the right to 
claim the minor child as exemptions. The law which took place in 
1994 (which does not govern the Decree in this case) changes that 
Rule. 
Previous court decisions in this state required that the 
parties and the court look to the "economic realities of any 
particular set of circumstances." In this case, the economic 




THE DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED 
UNTIMELY AND THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO 
CONSIDER THE APPEAL. 
Where a Notice of Appeal is not timely filed the court is 
without jurisdiction to consider the appeal and the appeal should 
be dismissed. Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1991). In this case, the first Order which denied the 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement was entered December 
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27, 1994. That Order was served pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration on the Defendant October 27, 1994. No appeal was 
taken. The second Order which was likewise served upon the 
Defendant pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration was 
entered February 3, 1995. No appeal was taken. The third Order 
which was entered May 2, 1995, is identical to the February 3, 
1995 Order except that the May 2nd Order has been approved as to 
form by the Defendant. It is a duplicate Order at best and does 
not affect the parties7 rights under the Decree. 
The confusion, if any, arises for the following reasons. 
The initial Order prepared by the Plaintiff's attorney included 
the court's findings and conclusions as well as the court's 
ruling. This Order was objected to and, after a hearing on 
January 9th, Plaintiff's counsel was instructed to prepare 
another Order which simply referred to the court's ruling. The 
court's findings would be established by the transcript of the 
ruling which the Defendant was reguired to obtain. On the same 
day as the court's decision directing the entry of the court's 
Order and the transcription of the ruling (of the October 24, 
1994 hearing), Plaintiff's counsel prepared the new Order and 
served it on the Defendant pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration. It was served upon the Defendant together with a 
transmitting cover letter which reminded the Defendant that he 
had five days to object and that the Order would be submitted 
pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration. There was no 
objection. The Order was submitted together with a certificate 
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of mailing. Because the Defendant had the original Order calling 
for his approval as to form, another Order was printed by 
Plaintiff's counsel and submitted to the court for entry. 
Apparently, sometime thereafter, the Defendant approved the 
January 9th Order as to form and submitted it to the court and it 
was entered on May 2, 1995. 
Even disregarding the court7s Order of December 27, 1994, 
the February 3, 1995 Order certainly should control the 
disposition of the Defendant's Motion. The June 1, 1995 Notice 
of Appeal is untimely and there was no effort to extend the time 
to file the Notice of Appeal. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL REIMBURSEMENT 
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE PARTIES' 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The issue on appeal is not which party should receive the 
right to claim the tax exemptions associated with their minor 
children. Rather, the parties agreed that the Plaintiff would 
have that right unless the Defendant determined that the 
exemptions were of more "value" to him than to the Plaintiff. 
The underlying consideration in this agreement was the relative 
tax benefit to one party or the other and who would save the most 
in actual taxes paid. This is largely a function of which tax 
"bracket" or effective date the parties experience. If the 
parties experience the same federal tax bracket, then presumably, 
the Defendant would not exercise his right because his payment 
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would be the same amount that he would save in taxes and there 
would be no benefit to him. Therefore, the underlying 
consideration of the parties' stipulation was to avoid the 
unnecessary payment of taxes. As will be seen hereafter, if the 
Defendant's interpretation of the Stipulation and Decree is 
adopted, it will mean the unnecessary payment of additional taxes 
(when the parties' tax returns are viewed together) and the 
assumption that the Plaintiff is filing her tax return under a 
status other than the status she actually utilizes. In every 
sense of the term, the Defendant's argument ignores the "economic 
realities" of the parties. 
Amended Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), §152(e) specifies 
that the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency exemption 
absent a waiver. Since that amendment a majority of the state 
court's considering the issue have ruled that the courts retain 
jurisdiction to allocate dependency exemptions to non-custodial 
parents. Serrano v. Serrano, 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989); Motes v. 
Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989). 
The primary issue addressed in Motes was 
whether a state divorce court has the 
authority to award a tax exemption for 
supported children to the non-custodial 
parent. Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974 (Utah 
App. 1992) (concurring opinion). 
In Motes the court held: 
State divorce courts must always recognize 
the financial benefit accompanying dependency 
exemptions when awarding alimony and child 
support. Thus, use of the power to order a 
custodial parent to execute a §152 
Declaration should not be used to evenly 
other otherwise divide the available 
exemptions without regard to the particular 
economic realities. Motes v. Motesf supra. 
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Allred v. Allredr supra, is in agreement with the Motes 
decision: 
First, the tax exemptions should not be 
awarded to the non-custodial parent without 
regard to the economic realities' to the 
particular case. . . In my view, this is the 
lesson of Motes: The award of the tax 
exemption for dependents should be based on 
economic realities and should be supported by 
adequate findings. Allred v. Allred, supra, 
(concurring opinion). 
In this case the following "economic realities" are not 
disputed: 
1. The Plaintiff has remarried and commenced filing a 
married-joint federal tax return in 1993.2 
2. The Plaintiff has determined that it is to her 
benefit, to reduce the lawful taxes which are due by filing 
a married-joint tax return. 
3. The parties' children are supported by way of 
support provided by the Plaintiff and her husband as well as 
child support paid by the Defendant. 
4. The Plaintiff's husband has a statutory duty under 
§78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) to support a 
step child to the same extent that a natural or adoptive 
parent is required to support a child. 
5. Under I.R.C. §6013(d)3), if a couple files a joint 
return, each spouse becomes jointly and severally liable for 
2
 The Defendant suggests that the allocation of dependency 
exemptions should be based upon "who provides the greater 
support". In addition to the fact that that is not the issue 
before the court on this appeal, there was no evidence introduced 
upon which the court could base a finding of who provides the 
greater support, at least when the step-parent's support is 
included in that comparison. 
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the full amount of tax due on the couple's combined 
earnings. (Furthermore, both spouses are also liable for 
assessments and penalties due to unreported income, 
disallowed deductions and the like.) I.R.C. §6653(b)(3) 
6. The rules for allocating dependency exemptions 
between divorced or separated parents are provided by the 
Internal Revenue Code § 152(e). For purposes of determining 
which parent provides more than one-half of the cost to 
support a child, support received from a parent's spouse 
upon remarriage is treated as having been received from the 
parent. I.R.C. §152(e)(5). 
No finding can be made as to which party would benefit the 
most by claiming the exemptions because the Defendant has never 
indicated the extent of his 1993 income. However, the Defendant 
did pay the Plaintiff for the increased amount of tax due under 
her married-joint tax return filing. This is in spite of the 
fact that the Plaintiff's spouse earns "in excess of $75,000 per 
year." (Brief of Appellant on appeal, p. 12) If that is the case, 
then the parties' stipulation accomplished exactly what was 
intended: the overall reduction of taxes when the parties' tax 
returns and overall liability are taken together. The only 
difference is that the Defendant does not want to pay for the 
Plaintiff's tax liability under the economic realties of this 
case which include the fact that the Plaintiff files a married-
joint return. 
If the Defendant's income tax bracket (including the income 
of his new spouse) is lower than the Plaintiff's under her 
married-joint filing then, presumably, the Defendant will not 
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wish to "purchase" the exemptions. In that event, the parties7 
stipulation accomplishes the same and legitimate goal that the 
parties had when they reached their stipulation: the overall 
reduction in combined and legitimate taxes due. 
The Court can also discern the intent of the parties when 
viewing the stipulation as a whole. In doing so, it should be 
noted that the Defendant's counsel read the stipulation for the 
record and prepared the Supplemental Decree of Divorce which 
responds, essentially, with the stipulation. The stipulation and 
the Decree provide that in order for the Defendant to claim the 
children as exemptions, he must pay "to Plaintiff any difference 
in her tax liability resulting from Defendant purchasing the 
right to claim said tax exemptions." (Decree of Divorce, fl6) 
The Defendant urges an interpretation which would require 
the addition of terms to the parties' agreement. This new term 
would state that for purposes of calculating the Plaintiff's tax 
liability, the parties would pretend that the Plaintiff was were 
filing a married-separate return. Aside from ignoring the 
"economic realities" of the Plaintiff's circumstances, the Decree 
and the stipulation simply does not provide for that method of 
calculating the Plaintiff's tax liability. 
Obviously, the parties could have agreed to terms which are 
now urged by the Defendant. The parties agreed for the 
termination of alimony upon the Plaintiff's remarriage. The 
parties contemplated that the Plaintiff would remarry at some 
point. Nevertheless, the stipulation and the Decree do not alter 
the method of calculating "her tax liability" in the event of 
remarriage. The rules governing the construction of contracts, 
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which the Defendant urges this Court to apply to the 
interpretation of the Decree in this case, would require that the 
trial court decision be sustained. 
The parties7 agreement and the Decree of Divorce is 
consistent with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and 
the laws of the State of Utah. Utah statute imposes upon a step 
parent the liability to support step children. The I.R.C. 
acknowledges and economic reality that a step parent will often 
provide support for step children. In such a case, the support 
received from a step parent is treated as having been received 
from the natural parent for purposes of allocating the dependency 
exemptions between divorced spouses. 
In a broader sense, the I.R.C, Utah Code Ann., and the 
Decree of Divorce acknowledge another very fundamental economic 
reality. Upon remarriage, the parties frequently if not 
typically commingle their wherewithal for the support of the 
family. Under those circumstances, it is equitable and 
reasonable to view the value of a dependency exemption in the 
same way that family finances and taxes are viewed: together. 
The Defendant has also failed to marshall the evidence in 
support of the court's decision. The Plaintiff testified by way 
of her affidavit that after the transfer of dependency exemptions 
for the tax year 1992, and when the Defendant learned of the 
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Plaintiff's remarriage plans, he indicated that he would not be 
"purchasing" the exemptions in the future because the Plaintiff 
would be filing a joint return and it would not be economical for 
the Defendant to purchase the exemptions in that event. That 
Affidavit is unrebutted on the record, as such, it is clear 
evidence in support of the Plaintiff's interpretation of the 
terms of the Stipulation and the Decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The Notice of Appeal is not timely and the court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider this matter. The court properly 
construed the stipulation and decree. The Plaintiff's tax 
liability should be based upon the "economic realities" in this 
case. One of those realities is that the Plaintiff files a 
married - joint return. Her tax liability should be consistent 
with that reality. The Plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees in 
the divorce action and should be awarded fees for this appeal. 
DATED THIS /%* ^ day of January, 1996. 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Frederick N. Green, certify that on the /*?/A- day of 
January, 1996, I served a copy of the attached Brief of Appellee 
upon Roger R. Fairbanks, Appellant Pro Se, in this matter by 
mailing a copy by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid to the following address: 8543 South Nutwood Circle, 
Sandy, Utah 89094. 
IEDERICK N. GREEN 
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SUSAN C. BRADFORD (5377) 
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IN THE DISTRICT- COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant. 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
Civil NO. 914902005DA 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
\ , ^ ' ^ . 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Commissioner Michael S. Evans on the 
13th day of July, 1994, the Plaintiff and the Defendant appearing 
in person and the Plaintiff being represented by her attorney of 
record, and the Defendant representing himself, the Court having 
entertained the motions of the parties, as well as the evidence 
and argument of the parties, and good cause otherwise appearing, 
it is, hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. That each party alleges the other party has engaged in 
inappropriate behavior during the times that the children were 
exchanged for visitation and, given the ages of the children, an 
order of "curb side" visitation appears to be in the children's 
best interests. 
2. That the parties dispute whether Defendant has 
substantially complied with the court's order of visitation in 
accordance with the standard schedule, which identifies a Friday 
6:00 p.m. starting date for visitation periods. It appears to be 
in the children's best interests that Defendant arrive no later 
than 7:00 p.m. on the date set for visitation and, in the event 
he should fail to do so, that Plaintiff be free to make other 
arrangements for the children. 
3. The Decree of Divorce specifically provides, in 
paragraph 4, Defendant's obligation to obtain life insurance, 
which life insurance Defendant has failed to obtain simply 
alleging that he cannot afford to so do. 
4. That it appears that Defendant was provided with 
Plaintiff's request for reimbursement regarding the children's 
medical bills, if not earlier then by way of pleadings submitted 
in support of Plaintiff's present motion, and it is reasonable 
that judgment be entered against Defendant in the amount of 
$755.00 as prayed. 
5. That the parties disagree with the interpretation of 
the Decree of Divorce as it relates to the award of attorney's 
fees to Plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce in paragraph 15 orders 
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $3,000 as a contribution 
to Plaintiff's attorney's fees and sets forth a payment schedule. 
The final sentence of paragraph 15, which is the disputed 
language provides, "In the event the Defendant becomes more than 
thirty days delinquent in payment of said obligation for 
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attorney's fees and costs, then Plaintiff shall be entitled to 
obtain a judgment against Defendant for the unpaid balance owing 
. . ." Plaintiff argues that any thirty day delinquency in any 
of the payments pursuant to schedule allows her to seek a 
judgment for any unpaid balance of the original $3,000 award, 
while Defendant argues that only those payments which were due 
according to the schedule of payments may be reduced to judgment. 
The Commissioner finds that the Decree is appropriately 
interpreted to require that any unpaid balance owing of the 
$3,000 attorney's fees awarded at the time of a thirty day 
delinquency, which has in fact occurred, is the appropriate 
interpretation of the Decree. 
6. That the parties shall be restrained from having any 
contact with one another or in any way coming about the person or 
premises of one another or harassing each other during times the 
children are exchanged for periods of visitation and the 
Defendant shall arrive at Plaintiff's home at the appointed time, 
in no event later than 7:00 p.m. when the visitation is to 
commence at 6:00 p.m., and remain in his vehicle while the 
Plaintiff sends the children out, with the process to be repeated 
at the end of any visitation period. 
7. In the event that the Defendant arrives more than one 
hour past the scheduled time for visitation, the Plaintiff shall 
be free to make other arrangements for the children. 
-3-
8. The issue of the Defendant's contempt for failure to 
obtain life insurance as ordered by the Decree is certified for 
further hearing before the above-entitled Court. 
9. The Defendant may purge himself of any finding of 
contempt in this regard by forthwith obtaining life insurance 
consistent with the Decree. 
10. The Plaintiff shall be awarded judgment against the 
Defendant in the amount of $7 55 representing one-half of the 
children's uninsured medical expenses and the issue of the 
Defendant's contempt in this regard is reserved pending his 
future performance. 
11. That the Defendant is admonished to abide by the terms 
of the Decree of Divorce in promptly making all payments of child 
support on the date due. The issue of the Defendant's contempt 
in this regard is reserved pending his future performance. 
12. That the Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
Defendant in the amount of $3,000 together with the judgment rate 
of interest, representing attorney's fees due and owing but 
unpaid pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
13. That the Defendant's Motion to Compel reimbursement of 
sums paid to the Plaintiff representing reimbursement to the 
Plaintiff for her tax liability from not claiming the parties 
minor children as her dependents for tax purposes is denied 
consistent with the Court's ruling based upon the Plaintiff's 
Objection to the Commissioner's recommendation. 
-4-
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14. That each party shall bear and pay their own attorneys 
fees and costs for this matter. 
n DATED THIS ^ \ day of w± ^_ 1994, 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED THIS ^1 day of U;A^„ V ^ A 
BY THE COURT: 
10N0RABLE MICHAEL 
DISTRICT COURT .JUDGE 
1994. 
-^ 
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL S. EVANS 
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER upon the following parties by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq. 
Defendant Pro Se 
8543 South 890 East 
Sandy, Utah 84 094 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
27th day of October, 1994. 
\ 
-*—4=*- ** _c -2L.H^T_(-
1994. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of October, 
p-J w»» ME* mm an» aon •=• era M B M warn ran wxn ram em c r j 
' V S ? 3 ! ^ 8615 SoutM 185 E^t fj 
, A^AmrJ Sandy, Utah 8400. I 
v x
^ • TPfOhj My Commission Eyp'rcs n 
5 O r > V May 19.1993 R 
F-169-90\RecOrder.Pld 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake 




COPY OF MINUTE ENTRY 
DATED JANUARY 9, 1995 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




FAIRBANKS, ROGER R 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 914902005 DA 
DATE 01/09/95 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY 
COURT REPORTER KATHY MORGAN 
COURT CLERK MGS 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. GREEN, FREDERICK N 
D. ATTY. FAIRBANKS, ROGER R 
THIS BEING THE TIME SET FOR HEARING ON THE OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED ORDER. 
THERE BEING AN ERROR IN THE MINUTE ENTRY DATED 10/24/94, THE 
COURT NOW CLARIFIES THE ORDER, THE OBJECTIONS ARE SUSTAINED FOR 
REASONS SET FORTH ON THE RECORD ON THE HEARING DATED 10/24/94. 
MR GREEN WILL SUBMIT THE NEW ORDER. MR FAIRBANKS IS TO ORDER 




COPY OF ORDER 
DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1995 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (5377) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
f lS.£B H5-STPIST 0OBRT 
i ' " " Jiioicta! District 
^ 8 3 1995 
SAL, L^Kb COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil NO. 914902005DA 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 24th day of October, 1994, before the Honorable Judge Michael 
R. Murphy, Presiding, based upon the Plaintiff's Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation, the Plaintiff appearing in person 
and through her attorney of record, and the Defendant appearing 
in person and as his own attorney, the matter having been 
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 and Rule 6-401 of 
the Code of Judicia] Administration, and the Court having granted 
oral argument and considered the evidence and argument of the 
parties, and good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff's objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendation is, and is hereby, sustained. 
2. That the Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied. 
3. That in all other respects the Commissioner's 
recommendation is affirmed insofar as no other portions thereof 
have been objected to. 
4. That the basis for this Order was articulated by the 
Court at the time of the ruling. The Defendant shall, as soon a 
possible, obtain a transcript of the ruling at the Defendant's 
expense which shall be made a part of this record and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
DATED THIS ^ day of , T/ , 1995. 
BY THE C0lIMJ^5rk"\ 
HONORABLE MICHAEL 'R^pftPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JV&gft^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
ORDER upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq. 
Defendant Pro Se 
261 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
9th, day of January, 1995. 
~L 
'•—'J J L J - — 
1995. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of January, 
My Commission Expires]: 
YiH \( ki y\ 
Notary Public ( 
Residing in Salt Lake 





COPY OF ORDER 
DATED MAY 2, 1995 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (53 77) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JILL FAIRBANKS, 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Civil No. 914902005DA 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 24th day of October, 1994, before the Honorable Judge Michael 
R. Murphy, Presiding, based upon the Plaintiff's Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation, the Plaintiff appearing in person 
and through her attorney of record, and the Defendant appearing 
in person and as his own attorney, the matter having been 
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 and Rule 6-401 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration, and the Court having granted 
oral argument and considered the evidence and argument of the 
parties, and good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff's objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendation is, and is hereby, sustained. 
2. That the Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied. 
FILED BfSTRJCTCOVRT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 1995 
SALT LAKE QGUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
3. That in all other respects the Commissioner's 
recommendation is affirmed insofar as no other portions thereof 
have been objected to. 
4. That the basis for this Order was articulated by the 
Court at the time of the ruling. The Defendant shall, as soon as 
possible, obtain a transcript of the ruling at the Defendant's 
expense which shall be made a part of this record and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
DATED THIS ^ day of \\ \ (\,W — ->^1995. 
BY THE COURT: \ 
7 < \ 
HONORABLE MICHAEL RV,MURPHY ' 
DISTRICT COURT ~JUDGlf 
Approved as to Form: 
/ ^ rA^/^-s 4/flfa* 
ROGEBT R. FAIRBANKS, ESQ. 
Defendant Pro Se 
-2-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
ORDER upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq. 
Defendant Pro Se 
261 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
^ day of -ec^ ofeer, 1995. 
.A v- v yQ k o 





day of v^V'ca^ 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
W)-
My Commission Expires: 
CGIb ^  v 
s F-l62fe9t ) \Order ^Kt2cf 0 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
COPY OF LETTER OF FREDERICK N. GREEN TO 
ROGER FAIRBANKS 
O I R E E N <& B E E R Y 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
622 N E W H O U S E B U I L D I N G 
10 E X C H A N G E P L A C E 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y . U T A H 841 1 1 
T E L E P H O N E ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 5 6 5 0 
F A X ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 5 6 5 8 
F R E D E R I C K ! N G R E E N 
R A Y M O N D S C O T T B E R R Y 
J U L I E V L U N D 
S U S A N C B R A D F O R D 
Januarys 1995 
Roger R. Fairbanks 
261 East 300 South, #300 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Fairbanks v. Fairbanks 
Dear Roger: 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, please find the 
enclosed Order. Please sign the Order and return it our office so that we may file it with the 
court. 
Notice of objection, if any, must be submitted to the court, and the undersigned, 
within five (5) days of service. 
Sincerely, 
GREEN & BERRY 
Frederick N. Green 
FNG/aa 
Enclosure 
cc: Jill Eyring 
K i x ) 
r-169 90\rairbanlcRo4 
ADDENDUM "F 
COPY OF SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
DATED JANUARY 19, 1992 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
Attorney for Defendant 
318 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant. 
) SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF 
) DIVORCE 
i Civil No. 91-4902005 DA 
Judge Michael Murphy 
The above-entitled matter came on for an in-Court 
conference before the Honorable Michael Murphy, District Court 
Judge, on the 17th day of August , 1992, at the hour of 
1:15 p.m., the plaintiff appearing in person with her counsel, 
Frederick N. Green, the defendant appearing in person with his 
counsel, Phillip W. Dyer. The parties had previously 
stipulated to a bifurcation of the proceedings such that the 
marital relationship was terminated and all other issues were 
reserved for trial. Thereupon, the parties having advised the 
Court that they had entered into a Stipulation resolving all 
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remaining issues, which Stipulation was read into the record 
and acknowledged by the parties in open Court to be his/her 
voluntary agreement. The Court then approved the Stipulation, 
the Court having made and entered its Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Supplemental Conclusions of Law, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, as 
and for base child support, the sum of $1,387*00 per month, 
less $200.00 per month as and for health insurance premiums, 
for a total base child support award of $1,187.00 per month. 
Said base chiid support shall be paid one-half (1/2) on the 
5th of each month and one-half (1/2) on the 20th of each 
month. The defendant shall, forthwith, provide plaintiff with 
evidence of his health insurance premium as set forth above. 
2. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, as 
and for alimony, the sum of $400.00 per month. Said alimony 
shall terminate upon tho occurrence of Lhe first of the 
following events: plaintiff remarries, plaintiff dies, 
plaintiff resides with an adult person of the opposite sex or 
until further order of this Court. Said alimony shall be paid 
one-halt (1/2) on the r>th of each month and one-half (1/2) on 
the 20tn of each month. 
i . f 
3. The defendant is ordered to maintain in effect the 
health insurance coverage through his employment for the 
benefit of the parties' minor children. The plaintiff may 
purchase additional/substitute health insurance coverage for 
the benefit of the parties' minor children if she so desires, 
and the credit against base child support given to defendant 
(in paragraph 1 hereinabove) shall abate upon plaintiff giving 
defendant written notice of such substitution of insurance. 
Further, in the event plaintiff purchases substitute health 
insurance coverage, plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay, 
and indemnify and hold defendant harmless thereon, all medical 
expenses not covered by said substitute health insurance as 
the result of pre-existing conditions which are not covered by 
said substitute insurance, provided those expenses would have 
been covered by the defendant's insurance. Furthermore, the 
parties are ordered to each pay one-half (1/2) of any other 
medical, dental, orthodontic and optical expenses reasonably 
and necessarily incurred for the benefir of the parties' minor 
children, including deductible amounts which are not covered 
by defendant's insurance or the substitute insurance and which 
are not governed by the provision hereinabove concerning 
substitute insurance and pre-existing conditions. In the 
event any of the parties' minor children reasonably and 
3 
necessarily requires orthodontia care, the plaintiff is 
ordered to provide defendant with forty-five (45) days advance 
notice of the orthodontic work to be performed so that 
defendant can make appropriate financial arrangements with the 
health care provider. 
4. The defendant is ordered to purchase, within three 
(3) months after the entry of the Supplemental Decree herein, 
and to pay the premiums thereon and maintain in effect during 
the children's minorities, a life insurance policy with a 
death benefit of $250,000^00, which names the parties' minor 
children as the sole and irrevocable beneficiaries thereon. 
Defendant shall have the discretion and authority to reduce 
(pro rata) the death benefit, without further Court order, as 
his child support obligation decreases upon each of the 
parties' minor children attaining her age of majority. The 
defendant shall provide plaintiff with evidence o± the 
insurance when procured, 
5. The defendant is ordered to cooperate in assisting 
the plaintiff to obtain dental insurance under the provisions 
of C.O.B.R.A., if possible. Plaintiff shall pay all expenses 
for said dental insurance including, but not limited to, the 
purchase thereon. 
6. The personal property of the parties is awarded as 
4 
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the parties have already divided it, except that defendant is 
ordered to deliver, forthwith, to the plaintiff the oak filing 
cabinet currently in his possession and pick up and exchange 
therefor the nightstand purchased by at Mervyn's by the 
defendant which is currently in the possession of the 
plaintiff. Otherwise, the parties' personal property is 
awarded to the party in possession of the same, free and clear 
of any claim of the other party. 
7. The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum 
of $340.00, which represents medical bills paid by plaintiff 
during the pendency of these proceedings. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded the sole care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor children, to-wit: Keri 
Fairbanks, born July 12, 1979; Amy Fairbanks, born September 
5, 1981; Heidi Fairbanks, born January 8, 1983; and Holly 
Fairbanks, born December 19, 1985. The defendant is awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation with the parties' minor 
children, in accordance with the standard visitation schedule 
adopted by the Th.»rd Judicial District Court, a copy of which 
is attached hpreto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
The defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with twenty-four 
(24) hours advance notice of his intent to not exercise any 
visitation. Further, the defendant's base child support 
5 
obligation shall abate by fifty percent (50%) when he 
exercises continuous visitation for twenty-five (25) of 
thirty (30) days, 
9. The plaintiff is awarded, free and clear of any claim 
of defendant, the parties' marital residence and real 
property, subject to the requirement that she assume and pay, 
and indemnify and hold defendant harmless thereon, the 
outstanding mortgage obligation(s) on said marital residence 
and real property. The defendant shall execute a Quit-claim 
Deed, forthwith, conveying his interest in the marital home to 
the plaintiff. 
10. The defendant is awarded, free and clear of any 
claim of plaintiff, his partnership interest in the law firm 
of Christensen, Jensen & Powell. The plaintiff is awarded, 
free and clear of any claim of defendant, her stock in U-Rent. 
11. The defendant is ordered to assume and pay, and 
indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless thereon, the Mastercard 
debt, the Promissory Note to First Security Bank, any tax 
liabilities resulting from said Promissory Note being 
defaulted and any debts incurred oy defendant since the date 
of the parties' separation. The plaintiff is ordered to 
assume and pay, and indemnify and hold defendant harmless 
thereon, the debts for the Vanagon, for the bedroom set, the 
6 
debt to plaintiff's father for the marital residence and the 
debt to Sears for the washer and dryer, and any debts incurred 
by plaintiff since "the date of the parties' separation. 
12. With respect to each and every debt and obligation 
of the parties set forth or described in this Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce, the parties' agreement to assume and pay, 
and indemnify the other, is in the nature of a support 
obligation and is intended to be non-dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. 
13. The plaintiff is deemed to have waived any claim for 
child support and alimony arrearages accruing prior to August 
of 1992 and defendant is deemed to have waived any claim for 
equity in the marital residence arising out of payment of the 
second mortgage. 
14. A qualified domestic relations order shall issue to 
the Administrator of defendant's retirement plans such that 
one-half (1/2) of all vested retirement benefits accruing up 
until the signing of this Supplemental Decree of Divorce shall 
be awarded to plaintiff pursuant to law. Said Order shall 
provide, however, that the sum of $9,335.48 shall be first 
deducted from the total of all accounts before any division of 
said retirement benefits occurs for the benefit of plaintiff. 
15. The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum 
7 
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of $3,000.00 as and for a contribution to plaintiff's 
attorney's fees and costs incurred herein, as follows: $50.00 
per month for the iirst year after entry of the parties' 
Amended Decree of Divorce; $100.00 per month during the 
second year after entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce; and, 
commencing in the third year afrer entry of the Amended Decree 
of Divorce, and continuing thereafter until said sum is paid 
in full, $150.00 per month; provided, however, that in the 
event defendant's obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff shall 
terminate, then defendant is ordered to increase the monthly 
payments listed hereinabove as follows; $100.00 per month for 
the first year after entry of the parties' Amended Decree of 
Divorce; $175.00 per month during the second year after entry 
of the Amended Decree of Divorce; and, commencing o_n the third 
year afrer entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce, and 
continuing thereafter until said sum is paid in full, $250.00 
per month. The increase in monthly payments shall commence in 
the respective year alimony terminates and shall not be 
applied retroactively to increase the amount of any payments 
already paid to plaintiff. The plaintiff is awarded interest 
on the unpaid balance of said attorney's fees at the rate of 
twelve percent (12%) but shall not be entitled to seek a 
judgment against the defendant for said attorney's fees and 
8 
costs unless defendant becomes thirty (30) days delinquent in 
the monthly payments set forth hereinabove. In the event 
defendant becomes more than thirty (30) days delinquent in 
payment of said obligation for attorney's fees and costs, then 
plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain a judgment against 
defendant for the unpaid balance owing, without further 
hearing, by giving defendant, written notice of default. 
16. The defendant is awarded the right to purchase the 
tax exemptions for the parties' minor children from plaintiff. 
Defendant may exercise this right by paying to plaintiff any 
difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant 
purchasing the riglrc to claim said tax exemptions. In order 
to implement this provision, the parties are ordered as 
follows: Each party shall exchange W-2 forms for the previous 
tax year no later than the end of February of the following 
year. Plaintiff 13 ordered to prepare her tax return and 
provide defendant with a copy by the end of February as 
required for the W-2 exchange herein. Defendant shall then 
have fifteen (15) days in which to elect to purchase any or 
all of the tax exemptions for the parties' minor children. 
Defendant is ordered to notify plaintiff by March 15th of his 
intent to purchase any of said exemptions and shall pay the 
expense plaintiff incurs to have her tax return recalculated 
9 
as the result of defendant's election to purchase any or all 
of said exemptions. Plaintiff is ordered to execute all 
necessary forms/documents so as to implement the provisions of 
this paragraph. Further, defendant is ordered to pay 
plaintiff the sums owing to plaintiff as the result of his 
purchase of any or all tax exemptions no later than April 
10th of each year. 
17. The parties are awarded, equally, the 1991 income 
tax refund after deducting $300.00 as payment toward the 
second mortgage. Defendant is therefore ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of $271.50 as and for her one-half (1/2) of 
said income tax refund. 
18. All provisions in the prior Order Bifurcating 
Proceedings shall remain in Jull force and effect, except as 
modified herein. 
19. This Decree of Divorce shall be effective, and 
entered, as of the date of hearing of this matter, which was 
August 17, 1992. 
DATED this H day of \4/vl , 1992. 
BY "THE COURT: 
^ _ 
HONORABLE MICHAEL MURPHY 
District Court Judge 
10 








v «• y c i ; 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)3S 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kathleen J. Giilman being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she served SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE upon 
the following parties by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
FREDERICK N. GREEN, ESQ. 
GREEN & EEPRY 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Scilt Lake City, 
Utah, on the /^ day oh^^%lAJL\M « 1993-
IjMiAdj^u^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SV70RN to before me this /*7 / (Jay of 
My Commission Q^ pi*ros4. 
! 
I 
f i n c—.* aaa *vs ">r> r 
Pti'.LUP DVcH 
136 South M&-» ^ >ti **et J 
Salt Lako City. Ut^ • 64101 . 
My Commission Expires • 
February 14, 1936 I 
State of Utah -
otary Public 
-Jte&^ ding at: 
j Salt Lake County, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
jss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. ) 
Kathleen J. Giliman, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she served NOTICE OF ENTRY OF SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
OF DIVORCE upon the following parties by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
FREDERICK N. GRFEN, ESQ. 
GREEN & EERRY 
528 Newhousa Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lako City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same,, sealed, with first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on the J^ZL day ofK \p3{(.lll{^ , 1993. 
0 6 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me 
J^2*=r=^ . 5.993. 
this J*t) /7da\ y of 
•**?" 
My Commission expires :,-; 
, Nat &ry —£y b 1 i c 
-Residing, at: 
;: v,, ""^ ii^ it Lake County, Utah 
ADDENDUM "G 
COPY OF TRANSCRIPT OF RULING OF JUDGE MURPHY 
FROM HEARING DATED AUGUST 17, 1992 
FUCnQlSTRICT COURT 










.OGER R. FAIRBANKS, 
DEFENDANT. 
:IVIL NO. 914902005 DA 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
HEARING OF AUGUST 17, 199 
A P P E 
FOR THE 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
JUDGE Or THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
A R A i! C E 5 
PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
FREDERICK N. GREEN, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY AT LAV? 
622 NEWHOUSE BUILDING 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 3 411: 
PHILLIP 17. DYER, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY AT LAN 
318 KEARNS BUILDING 
L3 6 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 410: 
REPORTED BY: GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, C.S.R. 
-081 p 
AUGUST 
OF ME, MR. FREDERICK GREEN IS HERE ON BEHALF OF MR. 
FAIRBANKS. M* . DYER HERE ON BEHALF OF MR. FAIRBANKS. 
BOTH PARTIES ARE PRESENT. 
AS I UNDERSTAND IT -- FIRST OF ALL, THIS MATTER 
IS SET FOR TRIAL ON THURSDAY. THE PARTIES HAVE REACHED A 
STIPULATION, I BELIEVE. IF THAT'S THE CASE, WOULD ONE OF 
THE COUNSEL RECITE THAT STIPULATION. MR. FAIRBANKS AND 
MRS. FAIRBANKS, YOU NEED TO LISTEN CLOSELY, BECAUSE I 
INTEND TO ASK YOU, AFTER IT'S RECITED ON THE RECORD, 
WHETHER OR MOT THAT STIPULATION IS ACCEPTABLE TO'YOU. 
MR. DYER: MY NAME IS PHILLIP DYER. ANN I 
REPRESENT THE DEFENDANT. I ALSO HAVE A CASE NUMBER IF 
THE COURT WOULD — 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 
MR. DYER: 91490205. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
MR. DYER: YOUR HONOR, IN THIS MATTER THE 
PARTIES HAVE AGREED THERE WILL BE AMENDED FINDINGS AND 
DECREE TO PROVIDE AS FOLLOWS: THE BASE CHILD SUPPORT 
WILL BE AMENDED TO SI , 387 DOLLARS LESS A $200 CREDIT FOR 
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS PAID FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE 
MINIR CHILDREN UPON SHOWING OF SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT THAT 








EXPENSE IS IN FACT BEING 
j THERE WILL BE ? 
$4 00 PER MONTH. THAT ALI 
| UPON REMARRIAGE. DEATH, 0 
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NLD PAY THE 
PREMIUM AND THE S200 CREDIT WOULD BE DISCONTINUED AND THE 
SI, 300 WOULD BE THE CORRE 
SHE WOULD AGREE 
CT SUM. 
TO HOLD MR. FAIRB 
FROM ANY INCREASED EXPENSES THAT RESULT FRO 
SUBSTITUTING THAT HEALTH 
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PAY ONE-HAWF OFF ALL THE 
NECESSARILY IN INCURRED, 
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HE yjOULD 3E REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THAT COVERAGE 
WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE DECREE, AND WOULD USE HIS BEST 
EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD. 
MR. FAIRBANKS WOULD ALSO AGREE TO COOPERATE 
WITH MRS. FAIRBANKS IN HELPING HER OBTAIN DENTAL 
INSURANCE AT HER OWN EXPENSE THROUGH HIS LAW FIRM IF 
THAT'S AVAILABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COBRA. 
PERSONAL PEOPERBY WOULD BE AS DIVIDED, EXCEPT 
THAT THE PARTIES WOULD EXCHANGE THE OAK FILING CABINET IN 
EXCHANGE FOR A NIGHT STAND THAT'S IN THE POSSESSION OF 
MRS. FAIRBANKS. 
MR. FAIRBANKS WOULD GIVE HER THE OAK FILING 
CABINET. ON THE OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS. MR. FAIRBANKS 
AGREES TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO PAY S340 IN OUTSTANDING 
MEDICAL BILLS UPON RECEIPT OF STATEMENTS FROM MRS. 
FAIRBANKS. 
VISITATION RIGHTS, MR. FAIRBANKS WILL RECEIVE 
STANDARD VISITATION RIGHTS THAT ARE STANDARD VISITATION 
RIGHTS OF THIS COURT, AS WELL AS HE WOULD GIVE 2 4 HOURS 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF INTENT NOT TO EXERCISE THAT VISITATION, 
THE HOME EQUITY, THERE WOULD BE NO CLAIM AS THE 
A n <* r 
AS TO THE DEBTS, MR. FAIRBANKS MILL PAY CM THE 
MASTERCARD, AMY DEBTS AFTER SEPARATION, AS WELL A3 THE 
PROMISSORY** MOTE TO FIRST SECURITY BANK IN THE SUM OF 
£16,200. HE WILL ALSO PAY ANY TAX LIABILITIES THAT 
RESULT FROM THAT NOTE BEING DEFAULTED. 
MRS. FAIRBANKS IS TO PAY THE VAMAGON, THE 
BEDROOM SET TO HSR FATHER, FOR THE HOME, AND TO SEARS ON 
THE WASHER AND DRYER, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER DEBTS THAT SHE 
MIGHT HAVE INCURRED SINCE THE SEPARATION. 
THE PARTIES AGREE TO ASSUME AND PAY THOSE DEBTS 
AND HOLD THE OTHER HARMLESS, AND THEY AGREE TO 
INDEMNIFICATION PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CHILD 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION, BOTH WAYS. 
AS TO MR. FAIRBANKS' CLAIM FOR BENEFITS FROM 
THE SECOND MORGAGE THAT WAS PAID OFF DURING THE PENDENCY 
OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, HE WOULD WAIVE ANY CLAIM AS TO ANY 
BENEFIT FROM THAT, IN CONSIDERATION OF MRS. FAIRBANKS 
WAIVING THE CLAIM IN TERMS OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES, WHICH 
IS A DISPUTED CLAIM. 
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ADMINISTRATOR TO CALCULATE THE PARTIES' INTEREST, DEDUCT 
THE SUM OF $3,349 FROM THE ACCOUNTS, THEN DIVIDING THE 
BALANCE EQUALLY. 
WITH RESPECT TO ATTORNEYS FEES, MR. FAIRBANKS 
WOULD AGREE TO CONTRIBUATE TOWARD MRS. FAIRBANKS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF 33,000. PAYABLE AS FOLLOWS: 
S50 PER MONTH FOR THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE ENTRY OF 
i DIVORCE, S100 PER MONTH THE SECOND YEAR, AND $150 PER 
MONTH THE THIRD YEAR, PROVIDED, HOWEVER., THAT SHOULD 
ALIMONY TERMINATE, THEN THAT WOULD BE REPECTIVELY 
INCREASED BY THE SUMS OF S50, $75, AND S100 PER YEAR IN 
EACH OF THOSE RESPECTIVE YEARS. 
THAT SUM WOULD BEAR INTEREST OF 12 PERCENT, BUT 
NO JUDGEMENT WOULD BE ENTERED UNLESS OR UNTIL! MR. 
FAIRBANKS BECAME 30 DAYS DELINQUENT, AT WHICH TIME MRS. 
FAIRBANKS WOULD BE ENTITLED TO JUDGEMENT WITHOUT A 
HEARING, UPON GIVING WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFAULT. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE 1991 TAX REFUND, THE 
PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT THAT SUM WILL BE SPLIT, WITH MR. 
FAIRBANKS ORDERED TO PAY THE SUM OF $27 0.50. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE TAX EXEMPTIONS, THE PARTIES 
HAVE AGREED THAT THEY WILL EACH EXCHANGE N-2 FORMS BY THE 
END OF FEBRUARY OF EACH YEAR. ADDITIONALLY. MRS. 
FAIRBANKS WILL PROVIDE HER TAX RETURN TO MR. FAIRBANKS, 
.AND HE CAN ELI'A? TO, WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS THEREAFTER, TO 
PROVIDE TAX RETURNS PREPARED AT HIS EXPENSE. HE COULD 
THEN PURCHASE ANY OF THE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE PARTIES' 
MINOR CHILDREN BY PAYING THE DIFFERENCE- 3ETWEEF KER TAX 
LIABILITY" BY NOT CLAIMING THOSE PARTICULAR EXEMPTIONS. 
HE MUST PAY THAT AMOUNT TO HER BY APRIL 10TH OF THAT 
YEAR. 
I BELIEVE I HAVE COVERED I: ALL. 
10 I THE COURT: IS THAT CORRFM A MR. GREEN? 
Ill MR. GREEN: I BELIEVE SO. ;OU? HONOR. 
THE COURT: MRS. FAIRBANKS, YOU HAVE HEARD THE 
RESOLUTION AS RECITED BY MR. DYER. IS THAT ACCEPTABLE TO 
14 | YOU? 
MRS. FAIRBANKS: YES,. IT : 5: . 
15 I THE COURT: MR. FAIRBANKS? 
17 I MR. BA1RBANKS: YES, IT IS, 
THE COURT: WHO IS GOING TO PREPARE THE 
19 | PAPERS? 
MR. DYER: I'LL PREPARE THEM, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SEND THEM TO ME. ADD 
YOU WILL SIGN OFF ON THOSE, AND THEY'LL BE ENTERED. 
MR. GREEN: YES. 
(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS WERE COMPLETED) 
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I , GAYLS B . CAMPBELL, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I 
AM A C E R T I F I E R SHORTHAND REPORTER AND O F F I C I A L COURT 
REPORTER IH AMD FOR THE THIRD J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T , STATE OF 
THAT AS SUCH I ATTENDED THE HEARING TRANSCRIBE! 
HEREIN AND REPORTED THE SAME VERBATIM IN STENOTYPE ; AND 
THEREAFTER CAUSED THE SAME TO BE TRANSCRIBED USING 
COMPUTER-AIDED-TRANSCRIPTION. 
THAT THE TRANSCRIPT I S TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE 
BEST OF MY A B I L I T Y . 
SIGNED THIS 13TH D,\Y OF OCTOBER, L9^ > -i"l .»_! J. 
7 - "IT ^ T T ' V TTT^lH 
GAYLE 3 . CAMPBELL., 
v ft i ! 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 361-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JILL (FAIRBANKS) EYRING, PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Civil No. 914902005DA 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jill (Fairbanks) Eyring, being first duly sworn upon her 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That she is the Plaintiff above-named and fully 
competent to make and execute this Affidavit. 
2. That this Affidavit is submitted in opposition to the 
Defendant's Motion and in support of the Plaintiff's Order to 
Show Cause. 
3. That the parties were divorced by Decree of Divorce 
which was supplemented on or about August 17, 1992, and provided 
for, among other things, the following: 
(a) That each party exchange tax forms, including the 
Plaintiff's tax return, after which the Defendant would have 
15 days to elect to purchase any or all of the tax 
t ' t ^ i -,. 
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exemptions by paying to the Plaintiff any difference in her 
tax liability resulting from the Defendant's claiming of the 
children as tax exemptions; 
(b) The Defendant was ordered to pay child support in 
equal installments on the 5th and 2 0th of each month; 
(c) The parties were ordered to pay one-half each of 
any medical, dental, orthodontic or optical expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred for the benefit of the 
minor children, including deductible amounts (except for 
pre-existing conditions and in the event that the Plaintiff 
purchased an alternative source of medical and health 
insurance); 
(d) The Defendant was ordered to purchase within three 
months of the entry of the supplemental Decree at $250,000 
life insurance policy naming the minor children of the 
parties as the sole and irrevocable beneficiaries thereon. 
4. That the Defendant was awarded standard visitation and 
is required to give 24 hours notice of his intention not to 
exercise any standard visitation. 
5. That the Defendant was ordered to pay attorney's fees 
in installments and in the event of a thirty day delinquency for 
judgment to enter together with interest. 
6. That the Defendant has never exchanged his W-2 form as 
required by the Decree. 
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7. That after waiting for and demanding the Defendant's 
W-2 form, the Plaintiff volunteered her W-2 form and tax returns 
before April 10, 1994. 
8. That in 1993, when the Defendant exercised his right to 
claim the exemptions relating to the children, the Defendant 
stated that he was aware that this would be the only year he 
would exercise that right because of the marriage of the 
Plaintiff and her husband and the fact that they would be filing 
a joint return which would save the Plaintiff and her husband 
more than the Defendant. 
9. That in February, 1994, the Plaintiff attempted to 
discuss the subject of taxes with the Defendant, but the 
Defendant hung up on the Plaintiff. 
10. That based upon the earlier statements of the 
Defendant, and the efforts of the Plaintiff to discuss the 
subject of taxes, the Plaintiff concluded that the Defendant 
would not be exercising any right to purchase the exemptions. 
11. In tne first week of April, 1994, the Defendant 
t 
contacted the Plaintiff's husband, asking for a copy of the 
return, which //as not ready to be filed at that time, but which 
was prepared and submitted to the Defendant. 
12. That during one of the conversations with the 
Defendant, the Defendant stated, "I'm not going to buy them [the 
exemptions], I am going to take them, and Jill better sign the 
paper or I'll xzake her to court and see if she can afford to 
fight against me because I can represent myself.11 
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13. That by the time the Defendant prepared his letter 
dated April 13, 1994, he had already received the information he 
was demanding. 
14. That in fact, the Plaintiff was employed in 1993, and 
her income is reflected on the tax return, which is a joint tax 
return with her husband. 
15. That Plaintiff, as a joint tax return filer, will be 
jointly liable for any taxes relating to the tax year 1993 which 
are related to the 1993 tax return. 
16. That the Defendant is attempting to ignore the fact 
that the Plaintiff files a joint tax return with her husband, 
that the Plaintiff is equally responsible for any taxes under 
that return, or future taxes, and that the Plaintiff's tax return 
is in fact the joint tax return filed with her husband for the 
tax year 1993. 
17. That the Defendant is habitually and continually late 
in making his child support payments. Of the last 42 child 
support payments made since the entry of the Decree, only two 
have been made on time. 
18. The Defendant's tardiness creates significant financial 
problems and burdens for the Plaintiff and her children. 
19. The Defendant refuses to pay his portion of any medical 
expenses related to the children. 
20. That in January, 1993, the Plaintiff was required to 
make demands for medical bills through the Defendant's attorney. 
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21. When the Plaintiff gives the Defendant the medical 
bills, he tears them up on the Plaintiff's front lawn, and, by 
way of foul and abusive language, informs her that he will not 
pay the bills and the kids do not need to go to the dentist. 
22. That the following is a list of medical expenses, which 
represents the Defendant's share thereof, all of which have been 
delivered to the Defendant and all of which he has failed to pay. 
Provider Amount Explanation 
Shopko Optical $105.00 Keri's contact lenses and eye exam 
Dr. Bladens 400.00 Dental 
Dental 30.00 Children's Sears dental bill 
Doctor visits 110.00 Children's visits to Dr. Stahl and 
Assoc, Dr. Meads and Dr. Stevens, Dr. 
Rogers, Dr. Speakman and Holy Cross 
Instacare 
Prescriptions $110.00 Twenty-two prescriptions at $5.00 each 
and half of a $10.00 co-pay 
TOTAL: $755.00 
23. That the Plaintiff has frequently demanded that the 
Plaintiff provide evidence of the life insurance specified in the 
Decree. At first, the Defendant stated that he forgot the 
company name and finally Defendant stated, "I never really had a 
policy and I don't plan on getting one." And, lfI will never get 
a policy. Take me to court and throw me in jail." 
24. That the Defendant is usually tardy in the exercise of 
his visitation. The Defendant being late and absent not only 
confuses the children, who prepare for his visits, but makes meal 
preparation and the Plaintiff's other planning very difficult. 
-5-
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25. That the Defendant has never called to say that he 
would not exercise visitation, and he has never called to say 
that he would be late. 
26. That when the Defendant does exercise visitation, he is 
verbally abusive, loud, and has come in the Plaintiff's home 
without invitation or permission. 
27. That on one occasion the Defendant while exercising 
visitation left the children in the care of their sister, Keri, 
age 14, while he left to spend the night with his girlfriend, but 
did not provide Keri with the address or phone number in the 
event of an emergency. 
Hi8. That the Defendant has consistently refused to keep the 
Plaintiff informed as to the children's whereabouts during 
periods of visitation. 
29. That the Plaintiff has paid nothing towards attorney's 
fees and the full sum, together with 12% interest, should enter 
as judgment. 
30. That the Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel 
to represent her in regards to the above-matters. 
31. That the Plaintiff requests the following relief of the 
Court: 
(a) that the Defendant be held in contempt of court 
for his willful and malicious violation of the Court's 
Decree in regards to procuring life insurance, the payment 
of medical bills, the timely payment of child support, and 
the timely exercise of visitation (barring notice); 
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(b) that judgment enter against the Defendant for 
$3,000 together with 12% interest; 
(c) that all visitation be limited to "curb-side" 
pick-up and drop-off; 
(d) that judgment enter for accrued and unpaid medical 
bills in the amount of $755; 
(e) that any untimely child support payments be 
assessed a $5.00 per day late fee; 
(f) that the Court order that in the event the 
Defendant is late for the exercise of his visitation by more 
than 3 0 minutes that the visitation be forfeited at the 
option of the Plaintiff so that other plans and arrangements 
may be made for the care of the children; 
(g) that the Plaintiff be awarded her attorney's fees 
and costs associated with the Order to Show Cause. 
DATED THIS day of May, 1994. 
JILL '(-FAIRBANKS) EYRjjNG [J 
aTTTTTAWT J AFFIAN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / [/,' day of May, 
1 9 9 4 
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'!- 'h:'»v<})9. «i,9.f*^ a2F°Pii--71""' * Residing in Salt Lake Y $J&£ t ^ ^ f f i . ^ ;'. County, State of Utah 
\ ^^<^ September^, II/QT"^  \ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Jill Fairbanks, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 914902005 DA 
vs. : 
COMMISSIONER: 
Roger R. Fairbanks, : Michael S. Evans 
Defendant. : 
The Commissioner having received proffers of testimony and argument from Counsel, 
having taken the parties' respective requests under advisement to allow a review of the pleadings 
on file and the exhibits submitted at hearing to allow a consideration of the parties respective 
arguments, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein now 
FINDS: 
1. Each party alleges the other party has engaged in inappropriate behavior during 
the times that the children were exchanged for visitation and, given the ages of the children, an 
order of "curb side" visitation appears to be in the children's best interests. 
2. The parties dispute whether defendant has substantially complied with the court's 
order of visitation in accordance with the standard schedule, which identifies a friday 6:00 p.m. 
starting date for visitation periods. It appears to be in the children's best interests that defendant 
arrive no later than 7:00 p.m. on the date set for visitation and, in the event he should fail to 
do so, that plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children. 
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3. The Decree of Divorce specifically provides, in paragraph 4, defendant's 
obligation to obtain life insurance, which life insurance defendant has failed to obtain simply 
alleging that he cannot afford to do so. 
4. It appears that defendant was provided with plaintiff's request for reimbursement 
regarding the children's medical bills, if not early then by way of pleadings submitted in support 
of plaintiff s present motion, and it is reasonable that judgment be entered against defendant in 
the amount of attorney's fees as prayed. 
5. It does not appear as though defendant has been delinquent in the payments of 
child support in an amount equal to support owing for a thirty day period and within the 
meaning of the statute and it is inappropriate to find such a delinquency has occurred and to 
enter an order to withhold and deliver child support. 
* 6. The parties disagree with the interpretation of the Decree of Divorce as it relates 
to the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce in paragraph 15 orders 
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $3,000.00 as a contribution to plaintiffs attorney's fees 
and sets forth a paymeiit schedule. The final sentence of paragraph 15, which is the disputed 
language provides, "In*'the event the defendant becomes more than thirty days delinquent in 
payment of said obligation for attorney's fees and costs, then plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain 
a judgment against defendant for the unpaid balance owing . . .". Plaintiff argues that any 
thirty day delinquency in any of the payments pursuant to schedule allows her to seek a 
judgment for any unpaid balance of the original $3,000.00 award, while defendant argues that 
only those payments which were due according to the schedule of payments may be reduced to 
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judgment. The Commissioner finds that the Decree is appropriately interpreted to require that 
any unpaid balance owing of the $3,000.00 attorney's fees awarded at the time of a thirty day 
delinquency, which has in fact occurred, is the appropriate interpretation of the Decree. 
7. The parties also dispute the language of paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce 
regarding the right to claim the parties' minor children as dependents for tax purposes. 
Paragraph 16 provides, in pertinent part, "The defendant is awarded the right to purchase the 
tax exemptions for the parties' minor children from plaintiff. Defendant may exercise this right 
by paying to plaintiff any difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant purchasing the 
right to claim said tax exemptions." 
The parties' dispute in this regard stems from plaintiff's remarriage and her argument 
that, although she remains substantially unemployed and generating minimal income for herself, 
that the tax liability resulting from her present husband's income is her shared liability and that 
only by defendant repaying all of the additional tax liability resulting from plaintiff and her 
present husband not claiming the children as their dependents are the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce fulfilled. Defendant argues, conversely, that it is only any tax liability plaintiff in her 
own name and as a result of her own earnings that he is required to reimburse. 
8. The child support award entered in this matter was entered pursuant to Utah's 
Child Support Guidelines attributing no income to plaintiff and requiring that defendant pay one 
hundred percent of the guideline amount of support. 
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9. Since the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter the Child Support 
Guidelines with respect to the award of the children as dependents for tax purposes has been 
amended and provides some further direction to the court. Section 78-45-7.21(2) provides, "In 
awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider: (a) as the primary 
factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the child; and (b) among 
other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent." (emphasis added) 
The appropriate interpretation of the disputed language as contained in the Decree of 
Divorce is as the defendant argues: that only the tax liability of these parents is to be considered 
in determining the amount, if any, defendant is to reimburse plaintiff for the right to claim the 
children as his dependents. Only if plaintiffs present husband's income is included in 
determining defendant's child support obligation would it be fair and consistent with the intent 
of the guidelines to allow the court to consider plaintiffs husband's tax liability in the award of 
the children as dependent's for tax purposes. 
RECOMMENDS: 
1. The parties be restrained from having any contact with one another during times 
the children are exchanged for periods of visitation and that defendant arrive at plaintiffs home 
at the appointed time, in no event later than 7:00 p.m. when the visitation is to commence at 
6:00 p.m., and remain in his vehicle while plaintiff sends the children out, with the process to 
be repeated at the end of any visitation period. 
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2. In the event defendant arrives more than one hour past the scheduled time for 
visitation, plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children. 
3. The issue of defendant's contempt for failure to obtain life insurance as ordered 
in the Decree of Divorce be certified for further hearing before the assigned judge. Defendant 
may purge himself of any finding of contempt in this regard by his forthwith obtaining life 
insurance consistent with the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $755.00 
representing one half of the children's uninsured medical expense. The issue of defendant's 
contempt in this regard be reserved pending his future performance. 
5. Defendant be admonished to abide by the terms of the Decree of Divorce in 
promptly make all payments of child support on the date due. The issue of defendant's contempt 
in this regard should be reserved pending his future performance. 
6. Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $3,000.00, together 
with judgment rate of interest, representing attorney's fees due, owing but unpaid pursuant to 
the Decree of Divorce. 
7. Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement of sums paid to plaintiff 
representing reimbursement to plaintiff for her tax liability resulting from not claiming the 
parties' minor children as her dependents for tax purposes be granted and plaintiff return, 
forthwith, that portion of the sums defendant previously paid which represent additional tax 
liability attributable to plaintiff's present husband. In the event plaintiff herself incurred any 
additional tax liability on her earnings as a result of not claiming the children as her 
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dependents for tax purposes, said sum should not be repaid to defendant. 
8. Each party bear their own attorney's fees and costs for this hearing. 
9. Plaintiffs Counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this recommendation. 
Dated this \ [f day of August, 1994. 
Michael S. Evans 
District Court Commissioner 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following this \ Lfl day of August, 1994. 
Frederick N. Green 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Roger R. Fairbanks 
Defendant 
594 West Murray Boulevard, Apt. 1-K 
Murray, UT 84123 
[Lg/^T-^r 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0) 
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (53 77) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JILL FAIRBANKS, PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
Plaintiff, OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION 
VS. 
Civil No. 91-4902005 DA 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 
Judge Michael Murphy 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff files the following responsive memorandum 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration in 
support of its motion objecting to the recommendation of the 
Commissioner. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the time of the divorce, the parties stipulated that the 
Plaintiff would be awarded the exemptions associated with the 
minor children subject to the Defendant's right to "purchase11 the 
exemptions by reimbursing the Plaintiff for the increased taxes 
associated with the loss of the exemptions. The issue is whether 
or not the calculation of increased taxes would be based upon the 
Plaintiff's joint income tax return filed with her husband, or 
the estimated or speculative tax consequence if the Plaintiff 
were to have filed a married/separate income tax return. 
Commissioner Evans has recommended that the tax consequences be 
based upon only the Plaintiff's tax liability, if she were to 
have filed a married/separate return, and excluding her husband's 
income.x 
FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced December 20, 1991. 
2. The divorce was by stipulation and contained the 
following provision: 
The Defendant is awarded the right to 
purchase the tax exemptions for the parties' 
minor chidlren from Plaintiff. Defendant may 
exercise this right by paying to Plaintiff 
any difference in her tax liability resulting 
from Defendant purchasing the right to claim 
said tax exemptions. In order to implement 
this provision, the parties are ordered as 
follows: Each party shall exchange W-2 forms 
for the previous tax year no later than the 
end of February of the following year. 
Plaintiff is ordered to prepare her tax 
return and provide Defendant with a copy by 
the end of February as required for the W-2 
exchange herein. Defendant shall then have 
fifteen (15) days in which to elect to 
purchase any or all of the tax exemptions for 
the parties' minor chidlren. Defendant is 
ordered to notify Plaintiff by March 15th of 
his intent to purchase any of said exemptions 
and shall pay the expense Plaintiff incurs to 
have her tax return recalculated as a result 
of defendant's election to purchase any or 
all of said exemptions. Plaintiff is ordered 
to execute all necessary forms/documents so 
as to implement the provisions of this 
paragraph. Further, Defendant is ordered to 
pay Plaintiff the sums owing to Plaintiff as 
the result of his purchase of any or all 
exemptions no later than April 10th of each 
year. 
This matter was taken under advisement. In so doing, the 
Commissioner acknowledged that it was a case of first impression for the 
Commissioner. 
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3. The Plaintiff has remarried. 
4. The Plaintiff has filed a married/joint tax return. 
5. The Plaintiff is and was substantially unemployed 
during the year 1993. 
6. The Plaintiff's husband has assisted the Plaintiff in 
caring for her children and his step-children, rather than 
requiring the Defendant to work. 
7. Child support is based upon the imputation of income to 
the Plaintiff at $731 per month in spite of her actual work 
status. 
8. The Plaintiff and her husband have determined that 
there will be significant tax savings if they file a 
married/joint return, rather than the parties each filing a 
married/separate return. 
9. There has been no determination and no evidence 
provided by either party as to the relative contribution between 
the Defendant, or the Plaintiff's household, for the cost of 
raising the minor children. 
10. Child support was stipulated to and has been paid 
pursuant to the child support guidelines in existence prior to 
July 1, 1994.2 
11. The Plaintiff and her current husband acknowledge that 
they are bound by the provisions of §78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended), as follows: 
9 
It appears that the Commissioner has based his recommendation in 
large part upon the policies of the child support guidelines which were 
amended July 1, 1994 as they relate to the award of exemptions. 
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A step-parent shall support a step child to 
the same extent that a natural or adoptive 




THE DEFENDANT'S SUGGESTION, AND THE 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION, WHICH WOULD 
IGNORE THE CONTRIBUTION OF A STEP-PARENT, IS 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THIS STATE, THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AND EQUITY. 
The Defendant's position, as well as the recommendation of 
the Commissioner, rests upon one pivotal, but flawed argument, 
to-wit: "Plaintiff . . . does not contribute financially to the 
cost of raising the parties four minor children." See 
Defendant's pro se Reply Memorandum, page 4. 
The Internal Revenue Code allocates dependency exemptions 
between divorced or separated parents in §152(c) I.R.C. The 
requirements are: (1) that one or both parents provided more than 
half the cost to support the child; (2) the parents must be 
divorced or legally separated; and, (3) one or both parents must 
have custody of the children more than half of the year. 
I.R.C. §152(e)(5) states that for purposes of requirement 
(1), above, support received from a parent's spouse upon 
remarriage is treated as having been received from the parent. 
The general rule is that the custodial parent is entitled to 
the exemption. Temp. Reg. §1.152-4 T(a)(26 C.F.R.), Q-l; I.R.C. 
§152(e)(1). 
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Section 78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) places 
upon the step-parent the "same duty as a natural parent" to 
support step-children. The Eyrings (the Plaintiff and her 
current spouse, who is the step-parent of the four minor children 
of these parties) have elected, for their personal reasons, to 
have the step-parent satisfy his statutory obligation and for the 
Plaintiff to essentially be unemployed. In keeping with the 
I.R.C §152(e)(5) and §78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), this court should view contributions to the support of 
the minor children based upon the contributions of a household, 
or the combination of the Plaintiff and her husband. The 
Defendant fails to acknowledge the tax treatment of contributions 
made by a step-parent, as well as the requirements of Utah law, 
in fashioning a strained and overly technical argument. 
POINT III. 
THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION DOES NOT 
DEAL WITH THE TAX TREATMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
OF A STEP-PARENT, OR THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH 
LAW AT ALL. 
Very simply, in the eyes of the Internal Revenue Service, 
according to the law of Utah, and reasonable expectation of these 
parties, the reference in the Decree to "parent" for purposes of 
tax exemptions, must include the parent and the step-parent, at 
least where the step-parent is obviously contributing to the 
support of the step children (in light of the unemployment of the 
natural parent). 
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Consistent with the Internal Revenue Code and the laws of 
this state and the reasonable expectation of the parties, the 
Plaintiff files a joint tax return with her husband. This is 
"her tax return under the Decree.11 The Plaintiff is jointly and 
severally liable for taxes due, penalties, and the like. If 
there is a tax obligation (due to the loss of the exemptions), 
the Plaintiff is liable for that change and increased tax. A 
married/joint return has been determined to be advantageous to 
the Plaintiff and her husband. The filing status of 
married/joint is, in fact, what the Plaintiff and her husband do. 
This should all be compared with the fiction that the Defendant 
engages in when suggesting that the tax liability of the "parent" 
be based upon the pretend filing of a married/separate return 
which would disadvantage the Plaintiff and her husband, indeed 
the family. 
The Defendant's argument, incredibly, must assume that the 
parties contemplated that neither of them would become married in 
the future. Such an assumption, in addition to being incorrect, 
is unrealistic. The Defendant has remarried. If the court were 
to adopt the Defendant's argument, then any tax advantage that he 
would gain by claiming the exemptions would also have to be based 
upon a married/separate return, rather than the likely 
married/joint return that he would want to file at that time. 
If the aim of this provision and like provisions in other 
decrees is to maximize the available income to the parties, the 
application of the Defendant's argument, in reality, does not 
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accomplish that. Furthermore, if the Defendant truly believes 
that the remarriage of the Plaintiff was not contemplated in the 
Decree, then it would certainly constitute a substantial and 
material change in circumstance which would require the 
modification of the Decree. Judicial economy and equity would 
suggest that such a course is unnecessary. 
The Commissioner's recommendation suggests that including 
the step-parent's income in determining the tax consequence of 
claiming or not claiming the exemptions would require the 
inclusion of step-parent income for child support determination. 
This is not so. In cases of imputed income, and similar 
language, the court does not suggest that the imputed income be 
the basis for estimating taxes and tax consequences. Rather, in 
this case, the basis of the Commissioner's recommendation assumes 
that the Plaintiff's income is zero (which is reality), rather 
than the imputed amount (which is fiction). The Defendant's 
position then takes the best of both worlds for his benefit 
regardless of reality and regardless of how such an argument 
impacts the four minor children. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of I.R.C. §152(e)(5) and §78-45-4.1, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended), the court should calculate the Plaintiff's tax 
consequences based upon her joint return. The joint return is a 
joint and several obligation. Any taxes due or consequences 
flowing from the filing of a joint tax return are the 
Plaintiff's. The Defendant ought not to prevail on an 
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inequitable and internally inconsistent argument. The 
Defendant's argument is, at least, overly technical and does not 
reflect the reality of the parties' experience. Finally, the 
Defendant's argument does not consider the best interests of the 
children because it does not maximize the tax savings available 
to the parties. 
DATED THIS / day of September, 1994. 
GREEN y& BERRY 
FR^IDERISK NT^REEN 
(&£xorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS OBJECTION TO 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION upon the following parties by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq. 
Defendant Pro Se 
8543 South 890 East 
Sandy, Utah 84 094 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
J day of September, 1994. 
( C\ 
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Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
i \ m P-
FNGMisc\Fairbank.Ord 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




FAIRBANKS, ROGER R 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 914902005 DA 
DATE 10/24/94 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY 
COURT REPORTER GAYLE CAMPBELL 
COURT CLERK MGS 
TYPE OF HEARING: OBJ. TO COM. RULING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. GREEN, FREDERICK N 
D. ATTY. FAIRBANKS, ROGER (PRO SE) 
THIS BEING THE TIME SET FOR HEARING ON THE OBJECTION'S TO THE 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATIONS. 
BASED ON THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL AND PARTIES, THE COURT 
ORDERS THE OBJECTIONS ARE OVERRULED. FREDERICK GREEN IS TO 
PREPARE THE ORDER. 
